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The project focuses on the early phases of life. Empirically, it will pay special attention to 
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Opening the black box of primary effects: Relative risk aversion and 
maternal time investments in preschool children†
Andrés Cardona (andres.cardona@uni-bielefeld.de)
Martin Diewald (martin.diewald@uni-bielefeld.de)
Bielefeld University, Germany
Abstract
Judging from the abundant and expanding literature on educational inequalities, the apparent consensus 
is that divergent educational outcomes of individuals can be explained by two main mechanisms: class-
specific differences in children’s skills (primary effects) and educational choices, net of skills
(secondary effects). Contrary to the widespread agreement that primary effects stem from differences in 
parental tangible and cultural resources and that secondary effects result from decisions made based on
class-specific constraints, we contend that parents across social classes invest in their children 
differently for equivalent levels of children’s perceived skills—thus, primary effects and secondary 
effects work in similar ways. Formulating a rational-choice model of primary effects, we hypothesize 
that parental investments in children’s skills during the early stages of their life course are stratified 
according to the combined effects of relative risk aversion and cumulative advantage. Using data from 
the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and controlling for parental resources, we tested this 
hypothesis by asking whether mothers spend more or less time engaged in cognitively stimulating 
activities with their preschool children at age 5 to 6 depending on the child’s observed past language 
skills and the parents’ social class. Ordinary least squares estimates suggest that mothers’ activities with 
their children not only are stratified across social classes but also reflect a class-specific reaction to
children’s observed past ability consistent with our assumed mechanisms. Lower-class mothers invest 
in cognitively stimulating activities in a selective way: the higher the perceived ability of the child, the 
more effort is invested in these activities; in contrast, higher-class mothers do not differentiate their 
investment according to their child’s observed ability. Level of maternal education and extent of child 
care support in the household have an additional positive impact on levels of activity. Implications of 
the results and possible extensions of the model are discussed.
Keywords: primary effects; secondary effects; relative risk aversion; cumulative advantage; skill 
development; parental investments
† Paper presented at the Spring Meeting of the Research Committee 28 Social Stratification and 
Mobility, International Sociological Association, Central European University, Budapest. May 10,
2014.
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1. Introduction
Despite the abundant interdisciplinary effort that goes into research on social mobility and educational 
inequality, the astonishingly universal and persistent influence of the family of origin—partially
reduced over the last decades by the undoubted successes of educational expansion and school 
democratization (Breen, Luijkx, Muller, & Pollak, 2010)—remains largely unexplained. The pathways 
from social origin to children’s attainment not only are due to a variety of social factors (Smeeding,
Erikson, & Jäntti, 2011) but also are intertwined with genetic influences in complex ways (Branigan, 
Freese, & McCallum, 2013). Aside from properly considering the genetic contribution to the 
transmission of advantage and disadvantage, two shortcomings in the previous research on social 
stratification are increasingly coming into focus. First, existing research devotes perhaps too much
attention to the conditions for upward mobility, whereas an important part of the durable reproduction
of inequality may be due to the fact that downward mobility from the top is mostly avoided and 
therefore less likely than upward mobility. Therefore, a social mechanism describing how downward 
mobility is avoided could make a particularly powerful contribution to the overall explanation of
durable inequality across social origins. Second, there is increasing evidence that the sensitive period of 
early childhood is already of seminal importance for the intergenerational transmission of advantage 
and disadvantage. In this early life stage, plasticity is more pronounced than it is later on, with 
unfavorable as well as beneficial experiences being more influential for individual development 
(Thomas & Johnson, 2008).
In this article, we intend to address both these shortcomings. We develop a formal model of primary 
effects based on parental decisions about investing in their children’s skills given the social class of the 
household and existing inequalities in parental resources. We assume that more favorable social origins 
are advantageous for children’s skill development because these parents have more material and 
cultural resources to invest. In addition, we argue that parents behave differently; the degree to which 
they invest in their children depends on their subjective level of uncertainty regarding the expected
success of their offspring in terms of reaching different positions in the social hierarchy. From this 
standpoint, the same observed ability of the child is evaluated differently by parents from different 
social origins. To test the main predictions of the model, we look at cognitively stimulating maternal 
activities with children at the age of 5 to 6 according to parental social class and resources, and 
children’s past verbal ability as observed by the mother when the child was 2 to 3 years of age. We
focus on social class but also consider household income, child care conditions, and the mother’s 
available time and education level. This allows us to determine whether class-based motives for
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avoiding downward mobility are due to an unequal distribution of resources between social classes, or 
whether they play a decisive role irrespective of such unequally distributed resources.
Our model fits well into the sociological research on the primary effects of social origin as well as into 
the economic research on skill production and parental investments. To explain this relationship, one
favorite approach in sociological research is to develop theories based on some variant of cultural 
capital (van de Werfhorst & Hofstede, 2007; Lareau, 2011), showing that things “money can’t buy” 
(Mayer, 1997) are often more important than income or poverty. We follow this line of research by 
focusing on parenting practices that can be understood as cognitively stimulating activities belonging to 
the “concerted cultivation” type of parenting described by Lareau (2011) as prevalent among middle 
and high-class parents to stimulate their children’s skill development. From an economic perspective,
these activities can also be seen as investments in the development of the child (Cunha & Heckman,
2007; Almond & Currie, 2011); they start long before school enrollment and target general skills that 
have been shown to be important for success in school, labor markets, and life in general (Heckman &
Kautz, 2012).
Although we do not deal with educational success in this article, we borrow from the relative risk 
aversion mechanism proposed by Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) to investigate the hitherto overlooked
possibility that the primary effects of skill development may result from the same constraint action and 
motivation to avoid downward mobility given class position as secondary effects on schooling, and not 
simply from an unequal distribution of resources.1 In addition, we consider a second mechanism, 
cumulative advantage, as a further process that explains differences in skill development over time. If 
we find that the mechanism underlying both primary and secondary social origin effects is similar and 
can show how it is consonant with cumulative processes of skill growth, we might provide a key to
understanding why the impact of social origin is so persistent in shaping life chances, and why the 
avoidance of downward mobility from the top contributes so much to this persistence. This finding
would also provide an example for Tilly’s (1998) observation that durable inequalities are structured by 
the repeated operation of the same mechanism for the same subgroups across different contexts.
This article is organized as follows: In Section 2 we formulate an analytical model of parental decisions 
and primary effects and derive its main predictions. To test model predictions, we use data from the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) on maternal cognitively stimulating activities with preschool 
children. Section 3 presents data, measures, and methods, and the results are displayed in Section 4. The 
                                                          
1 The model of relative risk aversion explicitly excludes primary effects from its explanandum (Breen & Yaish,
2006, p. 233). 
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final section discusses the relevance of our results to the question of intergenerational transmission of 
inequality and suggests some model extensions.
2. Parenting practices and social class: A formal model
To derive predictions about parental investment behavior, we develop a simple rational-choice model 
that resembles Breen and Goldthorpe’s (1997) model for secondary effects. Our model is based on three 
sets of assumptions: those related to the social structure—the system of positions in which individuals 
are embedded; those related to skills—what they are and how they grow; and, most central to the 
model, those related to parental choices—the factors that shape the way parents behave when allocating
resources to their children. In the final part of this section (Section 2.6), we present five model 
predictions based on these assumptions about parental investment behavior and children’s skills as a 
function of social class. Readers who are not interested in the formal structure of the model may skip 
Sections 2.1 to 2.5 and go directly to the discussion of the model predictions. 
2.1. Social structure
The social structure consists of a set of positions occupied by households which are associated with 
distinct sets of desirable goods and life chances. The exact boundaries of these positions need not be 
specified. They can be defined along the lines of types of employment relationships, as in the Erikson–
Goldthorpe–Portocarero (EGP) class scheme (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992, ch. 2) or alternative class 
models, as long as three conditions are met:
(1) The dimensions that define social positions are perceived by households; they are not nominally 
created groups, such as “the proletariat,” but correspond to salient attributes used by individuals to 
define themselves and others.2
(2) The positions demarcated by social structure can be ordered hierarchically from lower to higher in 
terms of desirability.
(3) There is a commonly shared agreement about the relative ordering of these positions. For the 
purposes of our model, and to keep the algebra simple, we assumed the existence of three social 
positions: high (H), intermediate (M), and low (L). The model can be extended to any number of 
positions higher than three. 
                                                          
2 In the case of the EGP scheme, it would be difficult to argue that individuals are aware of belonging to the 
“service class.” However, they certainly are aware of the type of employment relationship that dictates their 
working conditions and are able to compare it with others in different employment relationships.
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2.2. Skills
Skills encompass cognitive abilities that include but are not limited to those measured by IQ tests, as 
well as socioemotional capacities such as perseverance, achievement striving, assertiveness, ambition,
curiosity, sociability, and delay of gratification, which have a positive impact on economic and social 
success (Heckman & Kautz, 2012). Although skills are by definition multiple, to simplify the model we 
assumed the existence of a single dimension of skills, which can be understood as a bundle of various 
skills. Children are born with a skill endowment, designated s0. From this initial level, skills grow
through a cumulative, path-dependent process that is a function of past skill levels (stí1), where s 
represents skill and t represents time, and parental investments (It), as suggested by research on the 
economics of skill formation (Cunha & Heckman, 2007). We make no assumptions about the 
distribution of skills in society, contending that there may be a social gradient of initial skill 
endowments with unknown distribution as the result of both genetic factors and prenatal parental 
behavior (Hackman, Farah, & Meaney, 2010) (see Section 2.5 on mechanisms and reinforcing factors).
2.3. Parental choices
Parents and households are treated as a single entity that decides whether to invest in their children’s 
skills, and if so, how much. All the parents have only one child, so no distinction is made between 
decisions made by the mother or the father, nor is there a need to consider the intrahousehold allocation 
of resources among siblings. Parents decide how much to invest in their children’s skills given the costs 
of investment, available resources, and expected utility, which is a function of parental expectations 
about the child’s future position within the social structure. Aside from costs and available resources, 
investment decisions are affected by beliefs about the likelihood that parental efforts will pay off in 
terms of higher skill levelVʌDQGWKHH[SHFWHGSUREDELOLWLHVWKDWGLIIHUHQWOHYHOVRIVNLOOVwill confer 
differential access to positions in the social structure in the child’s future ș
How effective parents are in solving this allocation problem is an empirical question and not an 
assumption of our model. We do not pose any form of optimization that requires perfect information 
and superhuman abilities. We simply assume constrained action, that is, parents try their best to ensure 
their offspring’s future success by providing them with a good start in life in terms of skills, given 
available resources, investment costs, and expected benefits.
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2.3.1. Parental investments
In general, parental investments can be defined as all monetary, time, and emotional resources that 
parents provide to their children and that contribute to their well-being. The reason we use the concept 
of parental investment is not that we subscribe to an economistic or biologistic reduction of parenting to 
maximization of expected returns (Becker & Tomes, 1986) or offspring survival (Hamilton, 1964a, b; 
Trivers, 1972). Rather, we use the term investment because parental resources are non-gratuitous and 
finite (money, time, affection) and hence subject to allocation, and because resource allocation is not 
arbitrary but responds to parents’ expectations about the impact these resources are likely to have on 
their children’s skills and, ultimately, on their future social and economic success.
We explicitly narrow down the scope of our analysis to the subset of those parental investments that 
positively affect children’s skills. Among others, these investments include availability of books in the 
household or of stimulating leisure activities (such as playing an instrument), which have been shown—
and which parents often assume—to have a positive impact on a child’s skill development (Jaschke,
Eggermont, Honing, & Scherder, 2013; Schellenberg, 2011). This distinction refers to the concept of 
cultural capital suggested by Lareau (2011), who distinguished between “concerted cultivation,” which
tends to be found among the intermediate and higher classes, and “accomplishment of natural growth,”
which is predominant among the lower classes. In a corresponding view, these parental activities, seen 
as investments, are also part of the skill production function (Cunha, Heckman, & Schennach, 2010). 
Thus, the model is not about explaining the expressive side of parenting, nor is it about how much 
parents love their children and care for them, but rather it is about shedding light on the more 
instrumental side of parenting, on that extra effort some parents consciously make to secure an 
advantage for their children in the education system and, later, in labor markets by promoting their 
abilities early in life.
2.3.2. Costs
Parents are faced with direct costs and opportunity costs. Investments in children’s skills require 
attention and time spent with children as much as they do financial resources to pay for books, musical 
instruments, and private lessons. Opportunity costs take the form of less leisure time and foregone 
income. We assume that the costs for comparable investment levels are the same for parents in all social 
positions. 
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2.3.3. %HOLHIVDERXWVXFFHVVRISDUHQWDOLQYHVWPHQWVʌ
As in Breen and Goldthorpe’s (1997) model, in which the expected probabilities of success differ 
among pupils, in our model parents differ in their beliefs about how much their investments contribute 
to children’s skill development. To avoid cultural explanations of parental investments that pose the 
existence of class-specific parenting styles, we assume no class-specific differences in the ability of 
parents to provide their children with appropriaWHVWLPXODWLRQDQG WKXVQRGLIIHUHQFHV LQʌDVLGHIURP
individual deviations, which are not systematically related to social position.
2.3.4. Beliefs about skill levels and future social pRVLWLRQș
Parents expect their children to fare differently later in life depending on their skill levels. These beliefs 
DUHFDSWXUHGE\DVHWRIVXEMHFWLYHSUREDELOLWLHVși, which assigns to each level of skills a value between 
0 and 1 of reaching a KLJKș1LQWHUPHGLDWHș2), RUORZș3) social position, VXFKWKDWș3 = 1 í ș1 í ș2.
Because VNLOOVDUHDFRQWLQXRXVYDULDEOHWKHUHDUHDVPDQ\SUREDELOLWLHVșRIUHDFKLQJDJLYHQFODVVRI
destination as there are skill levels. 
2.3.5. Parental decision tree
For any given level of observed skills, parents decide between investing and not investing in their 
children. If they do invest, the success or failure of their efforts is determined by the subjective 
probability ʌ To each of these three possibilities they attach a different set of și probabilities. If
investments are successful, the set of subjective probabilities, Įi, captures parental expectations about 
entry into each one of the three possible positions in the social hierarchy. If the investments are not 
VXFFHVVIXO SUREDELOLWLHV DUH UHSUHVHQWHG E\ ȕi ZKHUHDV Ȗi represents the subjective probabilities of 
abstaining from investing in children. Note that the investment decisions made by parents are dynamic;
they observe s in each t and decide to invest or not to invest according to the decision tree depicted in 
Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Parental decision tree.
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2.4. $VVXPSWLRQVDERXWĮi, ȕi, Ȗi, DQGʌ
Although probabilities ʌ and și are subjective, we assume that individuals have some common beliefs 
about the relationship between skills and access to different positions in the social structure. Small 
deviations from the norm should not affect the predictions of the model. For a given level of observed 
skills(s), we assume the following conditions for parameter values:
Assumption i: ʌ!. Parents expect investments in stimulating activities to be successful, that is, to 
lead to higher skills than no investments.
Assumption ii: 7KH UHODWLYH RUGHULQJ RI Įi, ȕi, DQG Ȗi is equal for all individuals regardless of social 
position. 
Assumption iii: Į1s > ȕ1s > Ȗ1s. Successfully investing in cognitively stimulating activities raises the 
probability of reaching the highest social position (Į1s > ȕ1s). Even if investments in cognitively 
stimulating activities are not successful in increasing children’s skills, they are not perceived as harmful 
and hence are always thought to be conducive to achieving high social positions compared with not 
investing in children at all (ȕ1s > Ȗ1s).
Assumption iv: Ȗ3s ! ȕ3s ! Į3s (corollary of condition iii above). Not investing in cognitively 
stimulating activities increases the risk of ending up in the lowest social position. 
Assuming three points in the skill distribution—one from the top of the distribution (sT), one from the 
bottom (sB), and the average (sA)—three additional assumptions can be formulated:
Assumption v: Į1sT !Į1sA !Į1sB: Investing in children with high skill levels is believed to improve their
chances of reaching high social positions compared with investing in children with average or low skill
levels.
Assumption vi: Ȗ3sT !ȕ3sT !Į3sT > 0. Despite condition v above, high skill levels are not seen as a 
guarantee for avoiding the lowest social position.
Assumption vii: Į3sB !Į3sA !Į3sT; ȕ3sB !ȕ3sA > ȕ3sT; Ȗ3sB !Ȗ3sA > Ȗ3sT. Low skill levels are believed to 
increase the risk of entering the lowest social position.
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2.5. Mechanisms and reinforcing factors
In our model, we propose that two linked general mechanisms—relative risk aversion and cumulative 
advantage—combined with differences in parental resources can explain how social origin translates 
into unequal chances for children. The distinction between mechanisms and parental resources as 
reinforcing factors is not arbitrary. Reinforcing factors are constitutive elements of existing inequalities 
that set the stage for parental behavior. They are reified past inequalities, such as differences in parental 
income, education, or available time, which facilitate or impede investing successfully in children’s
skills.3 In contrast, the two mechanisms we propose refer to the generative processes that transform 
those reified structural conditions into fresh inequalities, perpetuating existing disparities through
constrained individual actions from one generation to the next.
2.5.1. Relative risk aversion
As suggested by Breen and Goldthorpe (1997), and later supported empirically by Breen and Yaish 
(2006), the ambition and perceived ability of children in the lower classes must be higher than those for 
children in the upper classes in order for parents to choose to continue their schooling and higher 
education. The reason for this is that a dominant reason for investing in education is to maintain status 
or prevent downward mobility. To reach a class position at least as good as the one with which children 
in lower classes begin, a lower level of education is needed, and a risky and costly continuation of the
child’s educational career is therefore less likely for a given level of motivation and/or ability. In other 
words, parents react differently to the same child ability or school performance depending on their own 
social class. This same argument can be extended to parental investments: if the goal of parents is to 
avoid downward social mobility, and if skills are perceived to be as consequential for their offspring’s 
future class positioning as educational decisions are, then their decision about whether or not to invest 
in their children should be in line with a risk-minimizing strategy that will keep them from sliding down
in the social hierarchy. Thus, parents will invest in their children if the expected probability of 
downward social mobility is lower than if they decide not to invest in their children’s skills. 
                                                          
3 Aside from time, money, and education, favorable genetic endowment, which is difficult to measure, certainly 
contributes to reinforcing factors. See Branigan et al. (2013) and Diewald, Baier, Schunck, and Schulz (in press) 
on how genetic factors interact with social forces to produce the impact of the family of origin on socioeconomic 
attainment.
11 
 
2.5.2. Cumulative advantage
If “skills beget skills and abilities beget abilities” (Cunha & Heckman, 2007, p. 35) via an interplay 
between observed child’s skills and parents’ reinforcing engagement in cognitively stimulating 
activities with the child, a strong version of cumulative advantage should describe skill growth in 
children (DiPrete & Eirich, 2006). Given the cumulative character of skill growth, parental investments 
will tend to show a certain level of path dependence: if parents believe in the benefits of their 
investments in terms of children’s skill growth as a function of observed skills, then children will tend 
to receive more from their parents if their skills are higher, which in turn enhances their skill 
development, thus creating a self-reinforcing beneficial spiral. Over time, small differences in ability 
should grow further apart. In our model, we focus on only one part of this cycle, namely, the 
assumption that a higher level of observed skills prompts more parental engagement in cognitively 
stimulating activities. The other side of the causal relationship, the effect of investments on skills, has 
been amply studied in the work of Heckman and others (e.g., Cuhna et al., 2010).
Note that depending on class position the effect of the two mechanisms we have just identified can 
potentially be contradicting. According to cumulative advantage, and insofar as “concerted cultivation” 
activities consume more time and energy than other parenting practices, parents should engage their 
children more in these activities than in others if the perceived skills of the child lead them to believe 
that the invested effort will fall on fertile ground. At the same time, investments in cognitively 
stimulating activities should be greatest if they promise to protect against the fear of future downward 
mobility, which is greatest if the level of skills is low. Because resources are distributed unequally 
among classes, this explanation implies that higher-class parents may invest in their children even if the 
ground is perceived to be less fertile, whereas lower-class parents make such investments only if what 
they perceive suggests a safe investment. How relative risk aversion and cumulative advantage interact, 
and whether they neutralize or reinforce each other, should be an empirical question. 
2.5.3. Reinforcing factors 
Because investments are costly, the distribution of resources directly affects the capacity of parents to 
invest. For example, there is ample evidence that not only do more highly educated mothers spend more 
time with their children than do less educated mothers (Guryan, Hurst, & Schettini Kearney, 2008;
Sayer, Gauthier, & Furstenberg, 2004), but they do so in qualitatively different activities, such as 
reading instead of watching television (Bianchi & Robinson, 1997; Hofferth & Sandberg, 2001). Also,
household income correlates positively with the amount of time parents spend with their children 
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(Guryan et al., 2008; Zick & Bryant, 1996). In short, if more resources are available in higher social 
positions, then parents in these positions would tend to invest more than parents in intermediate and low 
social positions.
2.6. Model predictions
Based on our assumptions about ʌ and și (see Section 2.4), the following three model predictions can 
be derived. Mathematical derivations of these predictions are presented in Appendix B.
2.6.1. Relative risk aversion
Prediction 1a: For any given level of children’s skills, parents in high social positions tend to invest 
more in their children than do parents in intermediate and low social positions. 
Prediction 1b: Compared with parents in intermediate social positions, parents in high social positions 
are more willing to invest in their children if they are at the bottom of the skill distribution relative to 
children with average skills. 
Prediction 1c: Compared with parents in high social positions, parents in intermediate and low social 
positions are more willing to invest in their children if they are at the top of the skill distribution relative 
to children with average skills. 
2.6.2. Cumulative advantage
Prediction 2: Parents invest more in children with higher skills than in children with lower skills. 
2.6.3. Reinforcing factors
Prediction 3: The more resources parents command, the higher their investments in their children’s
skill development.
3. Data, measures, and methods
3.1. Data
We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, v29), a representative longitudinal study
of private households in Germany that has been conducted annually since 1984 (Wagner, Frick, & 
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Schupp, 2007). The data come primarily from the mother–child questionnaires which were introduced 
in 2003 and which collect detailed information from mothers about various aspects of their children’s 
lives. Data on every child in the sample are collected every 2 years starting at birth. For our analysis, we 
pool all the completed mother–child questionnaires on children surveyed at ages 2 to 3 and 5 to 6
between 2005 and 2012 (N = 872) and combine these data with data from the household questionnaire 
and from parents’ individual questionnaires in the SOEP study. Of the pooled results, roughly 25% of 
the children are siblings belonging to the same household who were surveyed at different years of age.
We take advantage of this fact in our statistical analysis but do not conduct any sibling analyses.
3.2. Measures
Our dependent variable is parental investments, measured as mothers’ frequency of cognitively 
stimulating activities with their children. Mothers self-report the frequency of these activities using a
four-item scale (daily, several times per week, at least once a week, and never) which includes the 
following four types of activities: singing children’s songs with or to the child, painting or doing arts 
and crafts, reading or telling stories, and playing cards or the game of dice. These are considered
“quality time” activities in which the child is the primary focus (Price, 2008), hence we plausibly 
assume that they reflect developmental, especially cognitively stimulating, ways in which the mother 
interacts with her child (Zick & Bryant, 1996; Hofferth & Sandberg, 2001), as opposed to activities in 
which the parent and child simply spend time together. We test the scalability of these four items using 
both factor analysis and Mokken scale analysis, which is a more natural way to work with categorical 
data.4 Both methods suggest one dimension. We then construct a standardized sum index with the four 
items.
Our main explanatory variables are children’s skills and parental class position. In the SOEP study,
children’s skills are measured using a battery of items related to child development based on a modified 
version of the Vineland scale (Sparrow, Balla, & Cicchetti, 1984) and adapted for Germany by Tietze 
(1998). Of the different dimensions of child development measured by this scale, we focus on language 
skills because they are directly related to our measurement of investments.5 The scale includes five 
questions about children’s language skills, listed in Appendix A, which are answered by the mother 
with “yes,” “to some extent,” or “no.” We code each of the respective answers with 2, 1, or 0 to provide
                                                          
4 Mokken scale analysis is an item response theory (IRT) model that allows one to test the scalability of 
categorical items on a cumulative scale (Mokken, 1971; Molenaar, 1997).
5 The other three dimensions measured by this scale in SOEP are everyday skills, movement, and social 
relationships.
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a summary index for all five items, resulting in values between 0 (minimum) and 10 (maximum).
Because mothers are asked to rate their children’s skills, this measure confounds actual skill levels with
maternal beliefs about skill levels. Although this scale’s proxy character certainly increases errors in the 
measurement of actual skill levels, it offers an advantage for testing the predictions of our model, which 
is constructed around parental subjective beliefs. This would not have been the case had we used a more 
“objective” measure of skills that ignores maternal perceptions.
To measure social class, we use the EGP scheme (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992). Because our model 
requires a hierarchical ordering of classes, we adopt Breen and Yaish’s (2006) recommendation and 
work with a modified four-class model in which the high service class is at the top (class I), followed by 
the low service class (class II), then mixed classes (classes III, V, and VI), and the labor class at the 
bottom (class VII). These four classes are ordered based on the type of employment contract, service 
contract, or labor contract. The self-employed and the “petty bourgeoisie” (class IV) are excluded from 
the analysis on the assumption that mobility in these classes is more about the inheritance of property 
than about the attainment of status as a result of educational and occupational success (ibid., p. 242). In 
terms of our model, this means that mobility in those classes is not about promoting skills. By the same 
token, because mobility in the classes included in our analysis is not about inheritance of wealth, we 
exclude household wealth from the list of control variables. To these four classes we add a fifth group: 
the unemployed. As research on skill development and adverse events in the life course suggests,
parental unemployment may have a negative impact on child development partially through a direct 
effect on parental investments (see, e.g., Duncan, Brooks-Gunn, & Klebanov, 1994). To assign a 
household to any of the resulting five categories (one of the four EGP classes or the unemployed), we 
take the maximum value between mother and partner, if available.
In addition to children’s skills and parental class position, we include measures for parental resources, 
in particular household income and maternal education, as well as variables that affect maternal time 
availability. As a measure for income, the equivalized disposable income is used, which adjusts
household income to account for the number and age of household members according to the new
OECD scale. To measure education, the mother’s educational attainment is used according to the 
CASMIN typology, with four categories (basic, intermediate, maturity, and tertiary).
We consider a comprehensive list of controls that affect how much time mothers devote to cognitively 
stimulating activities with their children. Household composition is measured by considering the 
number of siblings in the household and family type (single mothers, couples, and multigenerational 
households). We also include dichotomous variables (yes/no) for at least one hour of child care in a 
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normal week by the partner or father, the grandparents, institutionalized daycare, or older siblings. For 
the mother, we also include age (in years), working hours per week, and overall self-reported child care 
time; the last variable was reported separately for weekends and weekdays. We add up these figures and 
divide the result by the number of hours in a 7-day week to produce an index of overall time devoted to 
child care. The index is defined in the range 0 (minimum) to 1 (maximum). This control is important 
because the frequency of cognitively stimulating activities could otherwise be confounded with the 
overall time devoted to activities that does not include cognitively stimulating ones or to activities
shared with siblings. Finally, we control for the child’s age (in months), gender, and any diagnosed 
impairments or health conditions (yes/no). Summary statistics are displayed in Table 1. Only those 
cases with complete data for the dependent and all independent variables are presented (N = 766).
Table 1. Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Frequency of maternal activities (std. index) 0.03 0.99 í3.20 1.81
Language skills of child 8.98 1.57 0 10
Age of child (in months) 69.02 3.86 62 79
Health of child (yes/no) 0.57 0.50 0 1
Gender of child (boys = 1) 0.49 0.50 0 1
No. of siblings in household 1.19 1.04 0 10
Child care by partner (yes/no) 0.75 0.43 0 1
Child care by father (yes/no) 0.08 0.27 0 1
Child care by grandparents (yes/no) 0.54 0.50 0 1
Day care (yes/no) 0.77 0.42 0 1
Child care by siblings (yes/no) 0.18 0.38 0 1
Equivalized annual household income (in 
thousand) 43.94 2524 2 288
Mother’s age (in years) 36.57 5.54 22 50
Mother's working time 17.92 16.25 0 80
Mother's years of education 12.98 2.82 7 18
Mother's total child care time (% week) 0.29 0.20 0 1
3.3. Analytical strategy 
We fit linear regressions with ordinary least squares estimates for children at ages 5 to 6. We compare 
frequencies of activities across individual children, not within families. To control for shared sibling 
variance in cases where more than one child had been surveyed at different waves in the same family,
we use clustered standard errors at the household level. We run two model variations. Model 1 focuses
on class and child characteristics only and excludes parental resources and other maternal and 
household covariates. It also includes an interaction term between social class and perceived past child
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language skills when children were 2 to 3 years old. Measuring the effect of past observed skills on 
present levels of investments should help us get around the problem of reverse causality. Model 2 adds
to Model 1 parental resources (income, family type, child care, maternal education) and variables 
affecting maternal available time. Based on these models, we test the five predictions formulated in 
Section 2.6.
4. Results
4.1. Bivariate analysis
Table 2 displays the average observed language skills of children at age 2 to 3 according to class. As 
expected and consistent with previous research, the skills of children even at this young age differ 
between higher and lower social classes.
Table 2. Average children’s language skills according to class in our sample
The frequency of cognitively stimulating activities across social classes are shown in Figure 1. We see, 
in line with Prediction 1 of our model, as well as the literature on cultural capital—especially the 
distinction between “concerted cultivation” in higher classes and “natural growth” in lower classes 
(Lareau, 2011)—the expected stratification of such activities. It is the same pattern that describes
average skills, with class I at the top and the unemployed at the bottom (remember that the index for 
frequency of activities is standardized around 0). The evidence one finds in Table 2 and Figure 2 is 
confirmed by a simple analysis of variance (ANOVA): children’s language skills and the frequency of 
maternal activities differ according to class (p < 0.01).
Class* Mean language skills
I 9.18
II 9.20
III, V, VI 8.95
VII 8.74
Unemployed 8.50
Overall average 8.98
*All class designations are from the EGP scheme 
except for Unemployed.
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Figure 2. Average frequency of activities according to social class
4.2. Multivariate analysis
Parameter estimates for Models 1 and 2 are shown in Table 3. Because both models include an 
interaction term, we made use of predicted mean values to visualize our results more clearly and to test 
our hypotheses. 
4.2.1. Relative risk aversion
Prediction 1a. As summarized in Figure 3, the adjusted average frequencies of activities by class in 
both models follow the decreasing pattern depicted in Figure 2, yet the differences among the classes 
are not statistically significant. Only the positive value for class I in Model 1 is statistically different 
from zero. Once parental resources are included in the model (Model 2), average values in all classes
tend to converge to the average. Relative class ordering remains intact, however: class I is at the top,
with above-average values, and the unemployed are at the bottom, with values below the average. This 
finding suggests that some but not all class differences with respect to frequency of activities, as
displayed in Figure 2, are due to inequalities in parental resources. Class still makes a difference after 
all control variables are included, which is compatible with our hypothesis that class-specific motives 
are agnostic to resources such as time, money, or education. However, as shown by the confidence 
intervals around the predicted averages in Figure 3, which combines the main and interaction effects, 
these “pure” class differences are estimated with broad confidence intervals.
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Table 3. Parameter estimates for Models 1 and 2
Model 1 Model 2
Child
Age í0.026 ** í0.022 **
(0.010) (0.010)
Health impairments 0.087 0.061
(0.073) (0.074)
Gender (boys) í0.284 *** í0.271 ***
(0.071) (0.072)
Language skills (tí1) í0.024 í0.024
(0.043) (0.044)
Household
EGP (ref. class I)
II í0.714 í0.644
(0.641) (0.727)
III, V, VI í0.772 í0.658
(0.583) (0.593)
VII í2.029 *** í1.858 **
(0.723) (0.740)
Unemployed í1.540 ** í1.307 *
(0.745) (0.730)
HH Income (yearly; 000) í0.001
(0.002)
Family type (ref. single mothers)
Couple 0.149
(0.164)
Multigenerational 0.703 *
(0.391)
Number of siblings í0.057
(0.051)
Child care
Partner í0.021
(0.105)
Father 0.128
(0.153)
Grandparents 0.018
(0.075)
Day care 0.097
(0.095)
Older siblings 0.015
(0.103)
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Model 1 Model 2
Mother
Working hours (per week) í0.002
Education (ref. basic) (0.003)
Intermediate 0.179
(0.118)
Maturity 0.310 **
(0.141)
Tertiary 0.278 **
(0.131)
Overall child care time 0.382 *
(0.198)
Interaction terms
Language skills (tí1) x EGP (ref. class I)
II 0.074 0.066
(0.068) (0.077)
III, V, VI 0.076 0.067
(0.063) (0.063)
VII 0.212 *** 0.201 **
(0.079) (0.081)
Unemployed 0.153 * 0.132 *
(0.081) (0.079)
(constant) 2.183 *** 1.548 *
No. of children 766 766
No. of households 670 670
R2 (adjusted) 0.039 0.046
Standard error is shown in parentheses; *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Figure 3. Predicted average frequency of activities according to class
Predictions 1b and 1c. As shown in Figure 4, the variation in the adjusted mean frequency of 
cognitively stimulating activities dependent on different levels of past observed language skills does not 
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follow the same pattern across social classes. As expected, the predicted mean frequency of activities 
for children with low skill levels in service class I is above average and greater than for children with 
high skill levels. However, these differences are small and not statistically significant. We therefore 
refrain from interpreting this result as compensatory maternal investments in cognitively stimulating 
activities. In contrast, and also consistent with our predictions, the opposite is true for intermediate
classes and particularly for the lower classes. Mothers in class VII and in the unemployed category
invest well below average in children with low skill levels and slightly above average in children with 
high skill levels. The size of the predicted underinvestment in children with low skill levels is 
considerable in terms of frequency of activities. Mothers in class VII invest 1.6 standard deviations 
below average, and unemployed mothers invest 1.0 standard deviation below average. Referring back to
the raw scores of the scale, a 1.0 standard deviation fewer activities corresponds to a reduction from 
doing an activity daily, say reading a book with the child, to never doing it, or to go from doing all four 
activities daily down to doing them several times per week. In short, maternal investments at the top of 
the class hierarchy appear not to be dependent on children’s observed skills. In contrast, mothers in the 
lower classes (class VII and unemployed) are more sensitive to observed skills by making below-
average investments in children with lower observed skill levels.
By comparing the two models, an additional conclusion can be drawn. The response of mothers to 
different children’s skill levels found in Model 1 does not change much if variables for parental 
resources—time, income, and education—are introduced. This finding suggests that the difference 
among classes in parental behavior given children’s skills are explained not by variations in resources
confounded with class membership but by class-specific motives.
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Figure 4. Contrast of adjusted mean values for frequency of activities according to class and past 
observed language skills
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4.2.2. Cumulative advantage
Prediction 2. So far we have shown that mothers in the lower class react selectively to observed past 
language skills, thus presumably reinforcing past skill levels, which constitutes a form of cumulative 
investment behavior in itself. On average for all mothers, there is also evidence of a cumulative 
advantage mechanism. As summarized in Table 4, the marginal effect of past skills on frequencies of 
activities irrespective of class position is positive and statistically significant. This is true for both 
Model 1 and Model 2 and gives credence to the cumulative character of parental investments as a 
function of children’s skills. 
Table 4. Marginal effect of past language skills on current frequency of activities
Marginal effect Std. error t p value [95% conf. interval]
Model 1 0.055 0.025 2.220 0.027 0.006 0.104
Model 2 0.047 0.026 1.790 0.074 í0.005 0.098
4.2.3. Reinforcing factors
Prediction 3. In addition to class effects through relative risk aversion and cumulative advantage,
parental resources reinforce differences in frequency of activities as well. Parameter estimates (Table 3,
Model 2) show that cultural and social resources in the form of maternal education and support for child 
care have a positive impact on maternal activities with the child. The effect of maternal education is 
particularly sizable and statistically significant and suggests that even within classes differences in 
cultural resources, which probably correlate with parenting abilities and parenting style, contribute to 
higher investments in cognitively stimulating activities. Similarly, if the mother lives in a household 
with her partner or in a multigenerational household, and if, in addition, the partner is actively involved 
in child care, the frequency of activities tends to be higher. Also, mothers who spend more time 
providing child care tend to undertake more cognitively stimulating activities with their children, which 
is certainly not surprising. What is surprising, however, is the negligible effect of income and maternal 
working time on the frequency of activities undertaken with the child. Low-income working mothers do 
not necessarily engage in fewer cognitively stimulating activities with their children, especially if they 
live with their partner or other members of the family, whereas single mothers with low education 
levels do tend to invest less.
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4.2.4. Additional tests of robustness
To further explore the impact of income and education and to test for the robustness of our results, we 
have also tried out more operationalizations of education and income as possibly relevant resources. For 
education we have considered education for both parents, taken separately as well as the maximum and 
minimum values for the household. Income has also been tested using quadratic terms and as a 
categorical variable to distinguish low-income households from the rest. Low-income households, as 
compared with high-income households, have been identified based on the European Union definition 
of an income equal to or below 60% of the equivalized disposable income (“at risk for poverty”).
Results remain stable in light of these modifications. (Details of these analyses can be obtained from the 
authors upon request.)
5. Discussion and outlook
In conclusion, our model predictions appear to hold up under empirical scrutiny. Mothers appear to
behave in a way that is consistent with two social mechanisms: relative risk aversion and cumulative 
advantage. In line with the hypothesis that parental investment behavior is class-specific, the frequency 
of cognitively stimulating activities that mothers share with their children varies across classes, from 
the service class at the top down to the labor contract class at the bottom. Although on average mothers
invest more in children with higher skill levels, there are class differences in terms of how much 
attention children with low skill levels receive. This appears to indicate that the interaction between the 
rich-get-richer cumulative process of skill growth and the motives of relative risk aversion operate 
differently within each class. In particular, those at the top of the class hierarchy appear to be 
insensitive to children’s skills and to invest equally in children across the skill distribution. Those at the 
bottom, by contrast, appear to invest reinforcingly, reacting mostly to high skill levels and giving less 
than average stimulation to children with low skill levels.
These results partially contradict the assumption of class-based cultures and habits where children are 
simply treated along uniform frames of “natural growth” versus “concerted cultivation” (Lareau, 2011).
If it is true at all, this assumption finds empirical support in our data for the higher service class only, 
whereas parents in lower classes and among the unemployed apparently are not simply caught up in 
parenting ideas that are disadvantageous for skill development, but selectively invest in parenting 
practices that are beneficial for skill development but restrict these practices to those offspring who are 
promising candidates from the outset. In fact, for children with high skill levels, and controlling for 
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resources, maternal investments are comparable across social classes. In a nutshell, parental investment 
behavior may explain both persistence of minimal downward mobility from the top of the social 
hierarchy (compensatory investments in children with low skill levels) and minimal upward mobility 
from the bottom (minimal investments in children with low skill levels).
Considering parental resources, we found that cultural and social resources, not material resources,
reinforce class differences in terms of frequency of activities. This makes our model of parental 
investments and class position compatible with accounts of intergenerational transmission of inequality 
based on cultural capital, if by that one means differences in parental behavior in terms of cognitively 
stimulating activities. Cultural practices in the form of parenting style may reinforce rational decisions 
dictated by motives to avoid downward mobility. We thus avoid contrasting or separating cultural 
capital explanations and rational choice as opposing pathways to explain social origin effects and 
instead integrate both into one model. It is striking that household income and working time have no 
effect on frequency of activities. This appears to indicate that parental investments are driven more by
class-specific motives and cultural resources than simply by composition effects in terms of material 
resources, which tend to correlate with social class. Our results therefore echo previous studies on the 
greater relevance of what “money can’t buy” (Mayer, 1997) within the family of origin as the starting 
point for future socioeconomic attainment.
Of course, both the model and the empirical analysis are not free from limitations and can be extended 
in future work. On the theoretical side, parents may be considered separately and may be modeled to
have different levels of risk aversion and be more or less successful in influencing each other in 
deciding how much to invest in their children. There may also be differences in parental investment 
behavior with respect to class membership. For example, parents in higher social positions may be more 
aware of the importance of skills for reaching high positions in the social hierarchy or more capable of 
providing the right type of stimulation for their children, which would make their subjective 
probabilities of investment success reinforce investments for any given level of child skills. It is also 
plausible to assume that it is more costly to invest in children with lower skill levels than in children 
with higher skill levels—remedial investments cost more.
On the empirical side, there are some interesting open questions that we could not address given our 
data. Regarding cumulative advantage, we observed only one side of the coin, namely, the effect of 
observed skills on parenting. How parenting affects skills growth was not measured. Similarly, we had 
no measures for subjective expectations regarding parental investments nor measures for perceived 
costs and expected returns. Such measures would allow testing not only model predictions but also 
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model assumptions. Perhaps more promising is the possibility that our model could contribute to a more 
general explanation of the transmission of social inequality if tested using longitudinal data. The finding 
of relative risk aversion as a mechanism that creates unequal opportunities also for primary social origin 
effects constitutes a variant of cumulative advantage in itself if considered from a life course 
perspective. Although we did not test the relevance of relative risk aversion in secondary effects of 
social origin, if the same mechanism is relevant across various different situations, it can be expected 
that inequalities become more durable if they start early in the life course. If that were the case, then the 
same mechanism, relative risk aversion, could account for primary and secondary effects and for early 
and later stages of the life course. In addition to longitudinal analysis, our model and empirical evidence 
can also be extended to make sense of the intrahousehold allocation of resources. Do parents reinforce 
or compensate for siblings’ differences in skills following the same logic of avoiding downward 
mobility, or are egalitarian rules the predominant force behind the distribution of parental investments 
within the family? Extending our model to sibling differences with appropriate data would also have the 
advantage of allowing us to control empirically for unobserved heterogeneities at the household level.
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Appendix A. Five questions from the Vineland scale adopted for use in the SOEP to measure a child’s 
language skills
For parents, it is always a big event when their child learns something new. Based on your 
child’s verbal skills, please indicate “yes,” “to some extent,” or “no” for each of the 
following questions about new things your child has learned:
1. Understands brief instructions such as “go get your shoes”?
2. Forms sentences with at least two words?
3. Speaks in full sentences (with four or more words)?
4. Listens attentively to a story for 5 minutes or longer?
5. Passes on simple messages such as “dinner is ready”?
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Appendix B. Mathematical derivations of model predictions
Expected probabilities of downward mobility
%DVHG RQ WKH SUREDELOLWLHV ʌ Įi, ȕi, DQG Ȗi, as defined in Section 4 (see Figure 1), the expected 
probabilities of downward mobility for investing or not investing in children for parents in the high and 
intermediate classes are summarized in Table B.1.
Table B.1. Expected probabilities of downward mobility for investing or not investing in children 
Social position Investing Not investing
High (H) ʌĮ2 +Į3) + (1 í ʌȕ2 + ȕ3) = ʌ1íĮ1) + (1 í ʌ1 í ȕ1) Ȗ2 + Ȗ3 = 1 í Ȗ1
Intermediate (I) ʌĮ3) + (1 í ʌȕ3) = ʌ1íĮ1íĮ2) + (1 í ʌ1 í ȕ1 í ȕ2) Ȗ3 = 1 í Ȗ1í Ȗ2
According to Table B.1, parents will invest in their children if they expect the probability shown in the 
second column to be smaller than the probability shown in the third column.
Proofs of model predictions for relative risk aversion
In the following proofs, model predictions are shown to follow logically from the premises of relative 
risk aversion and cumulative advantage. 
Prediction 1a. For any given level of children’s skills, parents in high social positions tend to invest 
more in children than parents in intermediate and low social positions. 
This is true if the subjective probability of downward mobility of investing in children relative to not 
investing in children is lower for parents in high social positions compared with parents in intermediate 
and low social positions:
஠ (ଵ ି ஑భ) ା (ଵି ஠)(ଵି ஒభ)
ଵ ି ஓభ <  
஠ (ଵ ି ஑భି ஑మ) ା (ଵି ஠)(ଵି ஒభି ஒమ)
ଵ ି ஓభ ି ஓమ (A1)
Proof:
A1 can be shown to be true if Ɏ Ƚଶ + (1െ  Ɏ) Ⱦଶ > ɀଶ
Given that the sum of Įi, ȕi, DQGȖi equals 1, the latter expression can be rewritten as: 
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(Ɏ Ƚଵ + (1െ  Ɏ) Ⱦଵ)  െ  ɀଵ < ɀଷ െ  (Ɏ Ƚଷ + (1െ  Ɏ) Ⱦଷ)  ( (A2)
Given Assumptions i to iv (described in Section 2.4), each side of A2 corresponds to a probability 
between 0 and 1. These probabilities represent, on the left, the expected return of reaching the highest 
social class by investing in children relative to not investing, and on the right, the expected risk of 
sinking to the lowest class by not investing in children relative to investing. The inequality A2 is 
nothing less than the formal definition of the relative risk aversion mechanism: the perceived risk of 
downward mobility of not investing (right side) needs to be higher than the expected reward of upward 
mobility of investing (left side). Thus, Prediction 1a will be true if parents place more value on avoiding 
downward mobility than on achieving upward mobility.
Prediction 1b. Compared with parents in intermediate social positions, parents in high social positions 
are more willing to invest in children at the bottom of the skill distribution relative to children with 
average skills (sA). 
This is true if the subjective probability of downward mobility of investing relative to not investing in 
children at the bottom of the skill distribution (sB) as compared with children with average skills (sA) is 
lower for parents from higher classes than for parents in intermediate classes:
ಘ (భ ష ಉభೞಳ) శ (భ ష ಘ)(భ ష ಊభೞಳ)
భ ష ಋభೞಳ
ಘ (భ ష ಉభೞಲ) శ (భ ష ಘ)(భ ష ಊభೞಲ)
భ ష ಋభೞಲ
<
ಘ (భ ష ಉభೞಳ ష ಉమೞಳ) శ (భ ష ಘ)(భ ష ಊభೞಳ ష ಊమೞಳ)
భ ష ಋభೞಳ ష ಋమೞಳ
ಘ (భ ష ಉభೞಲ ష ಉమೞಲ) శ (భ ష ಘ)(భ ష ಊభೞಲ ష ಊమೞಲ)
భ ష ಋభೞಲ షಋమೞಲ
 
(A3)
Proof:
A3 can be shown to be true if ஠ ൫હ૛
࢙࡮൯ା (૚ ି ஠) ઺૛࢙࡮
઻૛࢙࡮
> ஠ ൫હ૛࢙࡭൯ ା (૚ ି ஠) ઺૛࢙࡭઻૛࢙࡭ , which can be rewritten as:
(ଵ ି ஓభೞಲ ି ஓయೞಲ)
(ଵ ି ஓభೞಳ ି ஓయೞಳ)
 ή  ஠ ൫஑మೞಳ൯ ା (ଵ ି ஠) ஒమೞಳ஠ ൫஑మೞಲ൯ ା (ଵ ି ஠) ஒమೞಲ  > 1 (A4)
To be greater than 1, at least one fraction must be greater than 1 and the other greater than or equal to 1.
This is the case if:
(ɀଷ௦஻  െ  ɀଷ௦஺) ൒  (ɀଵ௦஺  െ  ɀଵ௦஻) (A4.1)
Ɏ ൫Ƚଵ௦஺ െ Ƚଵ௦஻൯ + (1 െ  Ɏ)(Ⱦଵ௦஺  െ Ⱦଵ௦஻) ൒  Ɏ ൫Ƚଷ௦஻ െ Ƚଷ௦஺൯+  (1 െ  Ɏ)(Ⱦଷ௦஻ െ Ⱦଵ௦஺) (A4.1)
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Given assumptions i to iv and v and vii, both sides of A4.1 and A4.2 are positive probabilities between 0 
and 1. Put simply, Prediction 1b will hold true if relative to children with average skills the perceived 
risks of sinking to the lowest class by not investing in children at the bottom of the skills distribution 
(A4.1) as well as the expected returns of reaching the higher class by investing in them (A4.2) are 
higher or at least equal.
Prediction 1c. Compared with parents in high social positions, parents in intermediate and low social 
positions are more willing to invest in children at the top of the skill distribution (sT) relative to children 
with average skills (sA). 
Analogous to Prediction 1b, this should be the case if the subjective probability of downward mobility 
of investing relative to not investing in children at the top of the skill distribution (sT) as compared with
children with average skills (sA) is lower for parents from an intermediate social position than for
parents in high social positions:
ಘ (భ – ಉభೞ೅– ಉమೞ೅) శ (భష ಘ)(భష ಊభೞ೅ష ಊమೞ೅)
1െ ɀ1ݏܶെɀ2ݏܶ
ಘ (భ – ಉభೞಲ– ಉమೞಲ) శ (భష ಘ)(భష ಊభೞಲష ಊమೞಲ)
1െ ɀ1ݏܣെɀ2ݏܣ
<
ಘ (భ –ಉభೞ೅) శ (భష ಘ)(భష ಊభೞ೅)
1െ ɀ1ݏܤ
ಘ (భ –ಉభೞಲ) శ (భష ಘ)(భష ಊభೞಲ)
1െ ɀ1ݏܤ
 (A5)
Proof:
Since sT > sA and sA > sB, A5 is equivalent to A3. By substituting sT for sA and sA for sB in A4.1 and 
A4.2, the following two conditions for A5 are obtained:
(ɀଷ௦஺ െ  ɀଷ௦்) ൒  (ɀଵ௦் െ  ɀଵ௦஺) (A6.1)
Ɏ ൫Ƚଵ௦் െ Ƚଵ௦஺൯+ (1െ  Ɏ)(Ⱦଵ௦் െ Ⱦଵ௦஺) ൒  Ɏ ൫Ƚଷ௦஺ െ Ƚଷ௦்൯+  (1െ  Ɏ)(Ⱦଷ௦஺ െ Ⱦଵ௦்) (A6.1)
Again, given assumptions i to iv and v and vii, both sides of A6.1 and A6.2 are positive probabilities 
between 0 and 1. The interpretation is the same as in Prediction 1c. The only difference is that 
Prediction 1c compares average skills with top skills and not bottom skills with average skills. 
Prediction 2. Parents invest more in children with higher skill levels than in children with lower skill
levels. 
31 
 
Given relative risk aversion, parents in all social positions will prefer to invest in a child with higher 
skill levels (s1) if the probabilities of downward mobility are lower than if the child had lower skill
levels (s0).6 Formally, if s1 > s0, the following is true for parents in high social positions:
஠ (ଵ ି ஑భೞభ) ା (ଵ ି ஠)(ଵ ି ஒభೞభ)
ଵ ି ஓభೞభ
< ஠ (ଵ ି ஑భ
ೞబ) ା (ଵ ି ஠)(ଵ ି ஒభೞబ)
ଵ ି ஓభೞబ
(A7)
Proof:
Define: οߙ =  Ƚଵ௦ଵ െ  Ƚଵ௦଴; : οߚ =  Ⱦଵ௦ଵ െ  Ⱦଵ௦଴; οߛ =  ɀଵ௦ଵ െ  ɀଵ௦଴
A7 is true if ߨ(οߙ) + (1 െ  ߨ)(οߚ) > οߛ, which can be rewritten as:
ቀߨ(Ƚଵ௦ଵ) + (1 െ  ߨ)(Ⱦଵ௦ଵ)ቁ  െ ɀଵ௦ଵ > ቀߨ(Ƚଵ௦଴) + (1 െ  ߨ)(Ⱦଵ௦଴)ቁ  െ  ɀଵ௦଴ (A8)
For parents in intermediate or low social positions, A7 takes the following form:
஠ (૚ ି હ૚࢙૚ ି હ૛࢙૚) ା (૚ ି ஠)(૚ ି ઺૚࢙૚ ି  ઺૛࢙૚)
૚ ି ஓ૚࢙૚ ି ஓ૛࢙૚
<  ஠ (૚ ି હ૚࢙૙ ି હ૛࢙૙) ା (૚ ି ஠)(૚ ି  ઺૚࢙૙ ି ઺૛࢙૙)૚ ି ஓ૚࢙૙ ି ஓ૛࢙૙ (A9)
Define οߙԢ =  (Ƚଵ௦ଵ  െ  Ƚଵ௦଴) +  (Ƚଶ௦ଵ  െ  Ƚଶ௦଴); : οߚԢ =  (Ⱦଵ௦ଵ  െ  Ⱦଵ௦଴) + (Ⱦଶ௦ଵ  െ  Ⱦଶ௦଴); οߛԢ =
(ɀଵ௦ଵ  െ  ɀଵ௦଴) + (ɀଶ௦ଵ  െ  ɀଶ௦଴)
Analogous to A8, A9 is true if ߨ(οߙԢ) + (1 െ  ߨ)(οߚԢ) > οߛԢ, which can be rewritten as:
ቀߨ(Ƚଷ௦ଵ) + (1 െ  ߨ)(Ⱦଷ௦ଵ)ቁ  െ  ɀଷ௦ଵ < ቀߨ(Ƚଷ௦଴) + (1 െ  ߨ)(Ⱦଷ௦଴)ቁ  െ  ɀଷ௦଴ (A10)
Given assumptions i to iv and v and vii, both sides of A8 and A10 are positive probabilities between 0 
and 1. In contrast to relative risk aversion, cumulative advantage emphasizes expected returns. 
Accordingly, inequalities A7 and A9 require the expected benefits to be greater for children with skills 
s1 than for children with skills s0. In A8, the expected probability of reaching the highest social class by 
investing relative to not investing has to be greater for children with skills s1 (left side), whereas in 
A10, the expected probability of reaching the lowest class by investing relative to not investing must be 
lower for children with skills s1 (left side).
                                                          
6 Note that whereas Predictions 1b and 1c express the relative risks of downward mobility among children with 
different skills, Prediction 2 is defined separately for each class and refers to the absolute perceived differences in 
risk for children with different skill levels.
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